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1. Introduction
Labor is a heterogeneous factor of production and differences in workers’ skill sets are a 
major source of this heterogeneity. While some firms rely heavily on highly skilled employees for 
their operations, others utilize predominantly low-skilled workers. In this paper, we investigate how a 
firm’s reliance on skilled labor affects its cash management policy. 
The theoretical link between workers’ skill level and cash holdings is based on an important 
friction in the labor market, namely, the costs of labor adjustment. When a firm adjusts its labor 
demand, it incurs the costs of firing, search, selection, hiring, and training, as well as costs associated 
with productivity losses. These costs are economically significant, amounting to a one-year payroll 
cost for the average worker, and increase with the skill level of the labor force (e.g., Oi 1962; Shapiro 
1986). In the presence of labor adjustment costs (LACs), a firm cannot adjust its labor demand 
costlessly and has an incentive to minimize its labor turnover (Dixit 1997). Failure to follow this 
optimal labor retention policy is particularly costly for firms relying on skilled employees, who are 
more likely to receive higher severance payments or file lawsuits if fired. Furthermore, searching, 
hiring, and training employees are more costly, for jobs that require advanced technical skills, which 
are usually in shorter supply (Manning 2003; Dolfin 2006; Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker 2012). 
This difficulty means that replacing skilled workers typically takes longer (Oi 1962), causing greater 
disruption to productivity. In addition, employee layoffs, as a cost-cutting response to demand slumps, 
have a negative effect on a firm’s stock price performance (Farber and Hallock 2009); the higher the 
skill level of the human capital laid off, the more pronounced the effect (Milanez 2012).  
The above arguments suggest that firms should avoid making costly labor adjustments by 
optimally maintaining employment at a stable level. This labor retention policy, however, exposes 
them to the risk of not being able to mitigate the impact of future cash flow shocks. We expect firms 
to have an incentive to hold precautionary cash to reduce this risk because cash reserves act as a 
buffer that safeguards against future cash flow uncertainty (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004; 
Han and Qiu 2007), thus enabling firms to maintain their optimal employment policy. Moreover, we 
argue that this precautionary motive for holding cash is stronger for firms that depend heavily on 
2 
skilled workers. The greater a firm’s reliance on skilled labor, the higher the costs of labor adjustment 
it faces and the stronger the incentive for the firm to retain skilled workers and hold precautionary 
cash. This argument is broadly consistent with Baghai et al. (2015) and Brown and Matsa (2016), who 
report that firms should adopt conservative financial policies to reduce the probability of distress as 
well as the labor-related costs of retaining and recruiting high-quality employees in distressed 
situations. In sum, we hypothesize that a firm’s reliance on skilled labor has a positive effect on its 
cash holdings.  
Crucial to our empirical analysis is the measurement of a firm’s reliance on skilled labor. As 
in Ochoa (2013) and Belo et al. (forthcoming), we construct an industry-specific labor skill index 
(LSI) based on Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) and the O*NET program classification of occupations according to skill level. The O*NET 
skill level classifications are based on how much education, related work experience, and training an 
employee needs to perform a given job at a competent level. LSI measures the weighted average skill 
level of the occupations within an industry and proxies for the LACs the average firm in that industry 
faces.  
Using LSI as a measure of labor skills, we find strong evidence that firms operating in 
industries with a higher share of skilled workers hold larger cash balances, which is consistent with 
our hypothesis. The impact of LSI on cash holdings is economically significant: A one standard 
deviation increase in the index is associated with an increase in the cash-to-assets ratio of 4.2 
percentage points, which translates to a 21.2% increase in the cash ratio relative to the sample mean. 
This positive association is robust to a variety of model specifications, including fixed effects 
regressions in which we control for firm and industry heterogeneity, as well as alternative definitions 
of both cash and labor skills.  
A major concern with a causal interpretation of the relation between LSI and cash holdings is 
the potential endogeneity of labor skills. A firm’s share of skilled labor may be endogenously chosen 
and related to unobservable factors that also affect its cash holdings, leading to a spurious correlation. 
We note that, by controlling for firm and industry fixed effects in our baseline regressions, we address 
one source of endogeneity that may lead to potential firm and industry heterogeneity bias. Reverse 
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causality poses yet another concern. A firm’s cash holdings may affect its ability to recruit skilled 
workers, implying causality from cash to LSI. We address these endogeneity concerns through three 
different strategies that involve using subsamples of industries and firms with reasonably similar 
characteristics, propensity score matching (PSM), and a quasi-natural experiment associated with 
exogenous variation in the costs of labor adjustment, the mechanism driving the relation between LSI 
and cash holdings.  
First, we run our analyses using subsamples of industries and firms with reasonably similar 
observable and unobservable characteristics. In addition to performing the fixed effects regressions 
mentioned above, these tests further reduce firm and industry heterogeneity bias. We focus on 
industries with above-median LSI (i.e., high-skill industries) as well as manufacturing industries and 
then double-sort firms along these dimensions and examine a subsample of manufacturing and high-
skill industries. The subsample results are similar to our baseline findings in that labor skills have a 
positive and significant impact on cash holdings. Second, we perform a series of PSM analyses to 
reduce heterogeneity along many dimensions as opposed to the single- or double-sorting used in the 
first test. Specifically, we match high-skill firms with low-skill firms on year, industry, and all the 
control variables using the whole sample or subsamples of similar firms. Our analyses of the 
treatment (high-skill) and matched (low-skill) firms again show that firms with greater reliance on 
skilled labor hold more cash. 
Our final strategy exploits an exogenous shock to the labor supply as a result of labor 
migration from New Orleans to Houston following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Between 100,000 and 
150,000 evacuees made the move, representing a 3%4% increase in the Houston population 
(McIntosh 2008). Given that those evacuees consisted of both highly and low-skilled workers (Gabe 
et al. 2005; McIntosh 2008; De Silva et al. 2010), the Katrina-induced increase in the labor supply 
should increase the thickness (i.e., the number of effective participants) of Houston’s local labor 
market (Moretti 2011) and therefore result in lower LACs on average for firms headquartered in 
Houston compared to matched control firms. Moreover, we argue that the negative impact of the labor 
migration following Hurricane Katrina on LACs should be more pronounced for high-skill Houston-
based firms, for at least two reasons. First, because the LACs of skilled workers are considerably 
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higher in magnitude than those of unskilled workers, modest and comparable percentage reductions in 
the LACs of both types of workers should lead to a much greater decrease in absolute terms in the 
LACs faced by high-skill firms. Second, the increased thickness of Houston’s local labor market is 
likely to reduce the probability of not filling a vacancy more for jobs requiring advanced skills than 
for unskilled jobs and to improve the employee-firm match quality more for highly skilled specialized 
employees than for low-skilled manual laborers (Moretti 2011; Bleakley and Lin 2012). Thus, the 
Katrina-induced migration to Houston should exert a stronger impact on the LACs of highly skilled 
workers than those of low-skilled workers. Based on these arguments, we expect Houston-based 
firms, in particular those with a greater share of skilled workers, to have had a lower precautionary 
savings motive for holding cash than the control firms. Using treatment firms headquartered in the 
Houston metropolitan area and matched firms headquartered in neighboring metropolitan areas, we 
run a difference-in-differences regression as well as a triple-difference specification with continuous 
treatment, the latter regression enabling us to capture the impact of exogenous variation in LACs on 
cash holdings conditional on different levels of LSI. Consistent with our predictions, the coefficients 
on the double- and triple-difference terms are negative and significant. Overall, while it is difficult to 
completely rule out endogeneity concerns, taken together, our three tests all provide consistent 
evidence of a causal effect of LSI on cash holdings. 
We next examine variation in the relation between LSI and cash holdings taking into account 
(a) state-level differences in the costs of downward and upward labor adjustments (firing versus hiring 
costs) and (b) firm-level differences in the precautionary motive for holding cash. First, we follow 
Serfling (2016) and exploit exogenous variation in the costs of firing following the state-level 
recognition of wrongful discharge laws (WDLs). Firms in states with stronger employment protection 
laws face higher firing costs, giving them a stronger precautionary motive to build up cash reserves. 
We further expect the effect of WDLs on firing costs to be more pronounced for high-skill firms 
because WDLs pertain generally to full-time and nonunionized workers, who are typically more 
skilled. Additionally, skilled workers are more likely to litigate, thereby resulting in higher litigation 
risk and higher lawsuit costs for high-skill firms. We then investigate the impact of exogenous 
variation in the costs of hiring for firms headquartered in states that provide hiring credits (i.e., 
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subsidies for companies that hire workers). We conjecture that the existence of high-quality hiring-
credit programs leads to lower costs of hiring, thus weakening the precautionary motive for holding 
cash. In addition, the impact of these programs on hiring costs is more pronounced for high-skill firms 
because a large number of high-quality hiring-credit programs aims at creating high-quality, high-pay 
jobs and, hence, are likely to target firms that require skilled labor, given the positive correlation 
between wages and labor skills. Consistent with those predictions, we find that the relation between 
LSI and cash holdings is more (less) pronounced the higher (lower) the firing (hiring) costs resulting 
from the recognition of WDLs (the availability of high-quality hiring-credit programs). Moreover, to 
the extent that WDLs and hiring credits proxy, respectively, for (state-level) variations in firing and 
hiring costs, our results also suggest that the impact of LSI, as a broader measure of LACs, on cash 
holdings is above and beyond the impacts of those individual proxies for LACs.  
Second, we examine subsamples of firms that are financially unconstrained as well as those 
that are financially constrained, for which the precautionary savings motive is most relevant 
(Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004, 2011). We find that the effect of skilled labor on cash 
holdings is indeed stronger for firms that are constrained, which gives further support to the 
precautionary motive explanation. 
We next report results from several tests that aim to alleviate concerns about mechanisms 
other than LACs driving our results. In particular, we address the concern that our results are 
primarily driven by a different channel relating to intangible capital. Skilled workers hold firm-
specific organizational capital and proprietary information that are typically embodied in key 
personnel (Brown and Petersen 2011; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013). Thus, firms with skilled labor 
may seek to protect valuable intangible assets, rather than labor skills, by holding precautionary cash. 
While the two channels (i.e., LACs and intangible capital) are not mutually exclusive and are thus 
difficult to disentangle, our tests show that the relation between labor skills and cash holdings remains 
positive and significant when we control for intangible capital using proxies established in recent 
studies (Peters and Taylor 2017) or concentrate on firms that have limited intangible capital. Taken 
together, these tests suggest that our findings are consistent with the LACs mechanism and not simply 
driven by an intangible capital channel. 
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The main contribution of our study is that we provide novel evidence of the effect of skilled 
labor on cash holdings. While recent theoretical research has shown how cash holdings are related to 
labor-related considerations (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2012; Boeri, Garibaldi, and Moen 2014; 
Bacchetta, Benhima, and Poilly 2015), only a few empirical studies have examined the effect of labor 
market frictions on corporate cash policies. Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) focus on the 
bargaining role of cash when dealing with union pressures and show that a firm facing stronger unions 
will strategically hold less cash to improve its bargaining position. Schmalz (2015) studies how cash 
can help firms regain financial flexibility following an exogenous increase in labor rigidity after 
unionization and argues that the interaction between unionization and cash holdings can be driven by 
an incentive to manage human capital risk. We note that these two studies focus on the impact of 
unionization on cash, and neither explicitly considers heterogeneity in the labor skill level. Labor 
rigidity from unionization is mainly related to low-skilled workers, who primarily have the incentive 
to unionize. In contrast, our focus is on highly skilled labor and the impact of heterogeneity in labor 
skills on cash holdings. 
Our study is related to a growing theoretical and empirical body of literature examining the 
interaction between frictions in the labor market and corporate capital structure. This literature seeks 
to explain firms’ leverage decisions through a number of labor-related considerations such as the 
human costs of bankruptcy (Berk, Stanton, and Zechner 2010), strategic bargaining with labor unions 
(Matsa 2010), employee treatment (Bae, Kang, and Wang 2011), unemployment risk (Agrawal and 
Matsa 2013), and labor market size (Kim 2015). In particular, recent research by Kuzmina (2013), 
Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015), and Serfling (2016) exploits exogenous changes in firing costs 
resulting from the use of temporary workers or the passage of employment protection laws and 
provides consistent evidence that financial leverage is negatively related to labor rigidity. Our 
findings contribute to existing evidence by showing that high-labor-skill firms with high LACs follow 
conservative financial policies by holding more cash. Moreover, by using labor skills as a proxy for 
the costs of labor adjustment encompassing both firing and hiring costs, our study adds to prior 
research that has mainly focused on the impact of firing costs on financial leverage.  
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Our results also contribute to the established literature investigating the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings. Existing studies identify a number of factors affecting cash management 
policies (e.g., Opler et al. 1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009; Azar, Kagy, and Schmalz 2016); see 
Almeida et al. (2014) for a recent survey of the literature. Our paper proposes workers’ skill level as a 
new and important determinant of cash holdings.  
Finally, our paper is closely related to the two recent studies mentioned earlier, by Ochoa 
(2013) and Belo et al. (forthcoming), which also consider the implications of labor heterogeneity. 
However, their focus differs from ours as they examine the impact of labor skills on asset prices. They 
show that firms with a high share of skilled labor have higher stock returns because they carry more 
risk and are more exposed to aggregate shocks in the economy. To the best of our knowledge, our 
study is the first to investigate the interaction between workers’ skill level and firms’ financial 
policies with a focus on cash holdings. 
2. Hypothesis Development
Why does skilled labor matter for corporate cash policy? We argue that cash holdings are 
important to firms facing labor market frictions due to the presence of costly labor adjustment. Our 
argument combines two strands of literature, on LACs and on the precautionary savings motive. In the 
labor economics literature, Oi (1962) introduces the premise that labor is a quasi-fixed factor such that 
firms incur costs when they adjust their labor demand. Examples of these costs include the costs of 
firing (e.g., severance pay, lawsuits), search (e.g., recruitment agency fees, advertising), selection and 
hiring (e.g., application screening, interviews), training, and costs associated with productivity losses 
(e.g., peer and supervisor disruption). Existing evidence shows that the LACs are economically 
significant and hence act as an important friction in the labor market (e.g., Pfann and Palm 1993; 
Hamermesh 1989, 1995; Manning 2006; Dube, Freeman, and Reich 2010).  
Prior studies further show that the costs of labor adjustment are not fixed but increase with the 
labor skill level. This is because skilled workers are more likely to receive larger amounts of 
severance pay or to file lawsuits if laid off, hence increasing firing costs for high-skill firms 
(Dertouzos, Holland, and Ebener 1988; Autor, Donohue, and Schwab 2006). Similarly, the costs of 
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hiring can be higher for high-skill firms because the search, selection, and recruitment processes are 
likely to be harder and more demanding for jobs that require advanced technical talents, which are 
usually in shorter supply (Manning 2003; Dolfin 2006). Oi (1962), for example, estimates the average 
lag between workers leaving a firm and being replaced to be longer for jobs with higher skill 
requirements, implying higher costs due to productivity disruption. In addition, a highly skilled job 
typically requires the incoming worker to undergo costly advanced training in the complex tasks he or 
she will perform. Indeed, the argument that LACs increase with workers’ skill level is well supported 
by existing evidence (Dube, Freeman, and Reich 2010; Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker 2012; 
Blatter et al. 2016).1  
The presence of economically significant LACs, especially those of skilled labor, provides 
firms with an incentive to optimally retain workers and minimize labor turnover (Oi 1962; Dixit 
1997). In light of recent research on the precautionary savings motive (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and 
Weisbach 2004), we argue that firms that seek to follow this optimal labor retention policy have an 
incentive to hold precautionary cash. In the presence of financing frictions, cash reserves allow a firm 
to hedge against future cash flow volatility (Han and Qiu 2007) while maintaining its optimal labor 
employment policy.2 We expect the precautionary savings motive to be stronger for firms with a 
higher share of skilled workers. The reason is that firms that rely more on skilled labor face higher 
LACs, which in turn slow their labor-demand reaction to cash flow shocks and generally reduce their 
ability to smooth unexpected future cash flows. In sum, we hypothesize that the degree to which a 
firm relies on skilled labor has a positive effect on its cash holdings. 
1 For example, using the 2003 and 2008 waves of the California Establishment Survey, Dube, Freeman, and 
Reich (2010) estimate the hiring costs per person in 2003 dollars to be $2,000 for blue collar and manual labor 
workers and $7,000 for professional and managerial employees. 
2 Although a firm can use alternatives to cash holdings, such as lines of credit, hedging, and unused debt 
capacity, cash remains the preferred choice (Almeida et al. 2014). Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013) 
show that firms with large liquidity risks tend to favor cash if their liquidity risk is aggregate in nature. 
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3. Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 Measuring the Reliance on Skilled Labor  
We construct an index to measure the extent of a firm’s reliance on skilled labor using the 
OES data from the BLS and the U.S. Department of Labor’s O*NET program classification of 







where Eji is the number of employees in industry i working in occupation j, Ei is the total number of 
employees in industry i, O is the total number of occupations in industry i, and Zj is the O*NET 
program classification. The latter program classifies occupations into five job zones, ranging from job 
zone 1, which includes occupations that require little or no skill, to job zone 5, which consists of 
occupations that require extensive skill sets. These skill-level classifications are based on how much 
education, related work experience, and training an employee needs to perform a job at a competent 
level.4 By construction, LSI is an industry-level index that measures the weighted-average skill level 
of the occupations within an industry, ranging from 1 to 5. A low score implies that the majority of 
workers in the industry requires little or no skill to perform their jobs, while a high score indicates that 
a large share of the industry’s workers needs extensive skill levels to perform their jobs adequately. 
We classify industries using three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for pre-2002 
data and four-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes for 2002 data and 
beyond (Donangelo 2014; Belo et al., forthcoming). Our approach of using the distribution of skilled 
occupations within an industry to proxy for firms’ reliance on skilled labor and their LACs is similar 
to approaches adopted in recent studies (Ochoa 2013; Donangelo 2014; Belo et al., forthcoming). 
Table 1 presents the average values of LSI for several industries. The results reveal important 
(cross-sectional) variation in LSI. For the purpose of illustration, we focus on industries with the 
3 The OES dataset is based on surveys that track employment across occupations and industries and covers 
about 200,000 non-farm establishments in the U.S. every six months, not including self-employed workers. 
4 The detailed job-zone classifications are available at http://www.onetonline.org/help/online/zones.  
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highest and lowest degrees of reliance on skilled workers (i.e., high- and low-skill industries). At the 
high end, as expected, high-skill industries include legal services, engineering and architectural 
services, accounting and tax preparation services, and scientific R&D services. At the low end, 
gasoline stations, services to buildings, grocery stores, and eating and drinking establishments are 
examples of low-skill industries. 
3.2 Sample Selection and Variables 
We first use the OES dataset to obtain industry-level occupational data for 19992012.5 Next, 
we merge these data with job-zone (occupational) skill-level classifications from the O*NET 
program. Starting with the population of Compustat firms over the same sample period, we use a 
firm’s industry membership, defined by the three-digit SIC code pre-2002 or the four-digit NAICS 
code from 2002 onward, to match the firm with a corresponding LSI score. We exclude firms with 
missing data for the main variables in our regressions. Consistent with the extant literature, we also 
exclude financial firms and utilities (i.e., firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 or 4900 and 
4999). 
The dependent variable in our regressions is cash holdings, which we measure using the ratio of 
cash and short-term investments to total assets. However, our results are robust to alternative 
measures of cash holdings, as reported in Section 5.2. In terms of the control variables, we follow 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) and include the following determinants of cash holdings: cash flow, 
net working capital, capital expenditures, leverage, acquisitions, Tobin’s Q (market to book), size, 
industry cash flow volatility, and R&D expenditures; see Table 2 for detailed variable definitions. We 
winsorize these variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distributions to mitigate the effect of 
5 Although the OES data are available from 1988, we start our sample in 1999 for two reasons. First, prior to 
1997, the OES data were collected over three-year survey cycles, meaning that the data for each industry were 
updated once every three years. The frequency of the data collection only increased to an annual cycle starting 
in 1997. Second, the O*NET program uses the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) taxonomy to define 
occupations. The OES dataset only began to use the same SOC taxonomy in 1999. 
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outliers. The final sample has 68,057 firm–year observations representing 10,760 unique firms 
covering 19992012. 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for cash holdings, LSI, and the control variables in the 
baseline specification. The mean and median cash holdings in our sample are 19.8% and 10.5%, 
respectively. These figures are in line with Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), who report mean (median) 
cash holdings ranging from 19.4% to 24.0% (7.7% to 14.8%) for 19992006. LSI has a mean and 
standard deviation of 2.471 and 0.501, respectively, which are very close to the figures reported in 
recent studies. For example, Ochoa (2013) reports an average LSI of 2.668, with a standard deviation 
of 0.448. 
Table 3 shows the results of a univariate analysis conducted to compare the characteristics of 
firms with above- and below-median LSI scores (i.e., high- and low-labor-skill firms). Column 1 
reports the average characteristics of all firms in the sample. Columns 2 and 3 present the mean 
characteristics of high- and low-skill firms, respectively. Column 4 reports the significance levels for 
the t-tests of differences in the mean characteristics.6 Column 5 reports the significance levels of 
differences when we perform the t-tests allowing the standard errors to be clustered at the industry 
level. Our comparison reveals that firms that rely more on skilled labor hold more cash. Specifically, 
the average cash holdings are 26.1% for high-skill firms compared to 13.6% for low-skill firms. The 
difference of 12.5 percentage points is statistically significant at the 1% level, whether the standard 
errors are clustered or not, and is economically significant as it amounts to 63% of the cash balances of 
the average firm in our sample (19.8%). We also find that firms that rely more on skilled labor tend to 
be smaller, pay out less in dividends, have better growth opportunities, use less financial leverage, 
invest more in R&D, and operate in industries with more volatile cash flows. However, the differences 
in these characteristics are not always statistically significant between the high and low LSI groups 
once we allow for clustering of the standard errors. 
6 Tests based on median firm characteristics provide similar results, but are omitted to conserve space. 
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4. Empirical Results
4.1 Cash Holdings and Skilled Labor: Main Results 
Table 4 presents the regression results on the relation between the degree to which firms rely 
on skilled labor and their cash holdings. Since our key test variable, LSI, is measured at the industry 
level, we report p-values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the industry 
level. The only exception is Model 4, where we perform a cross-sectional regression using industry 
time-series averages and thus report p-values based on non-clustered heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. All regressions include year fixed effects (except for the cross-sectional specifications 
in Models 3 and 4).  
In Model 1, we perform a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and regress cash 
holdings on the control variables mentioned above. For brevity, we do not discuss these results here, 
but note that they are broadly consistent with previous evidence in the literature (e.g., Bates, Kahle, 
and Stulz 2009) and in line with theoretical predictions regarding their effects on cash holdings. In 
Model 2, we include LSI as an additional explanatory variable and find that the coefficient on LSI is 
positive and highly significant. It is also economically significant at 0.084 as a one standard deviation 
increase in the index is associated with an increase in the cash-to-total assets ratio of 4.2 percentage 
points, which translates to a 21.2% increase in the cash ratio relative to the sample mean. The 
coefficients on the other explanatory variables are quite similar to those in Model 1, suggesting that 
the effect of LSI on cash holdings is not driven by its correlation with these firm characteristics.  
We next investigate how the cross-sectional variation in cash holdings is determined by LSI. 
In Model 3, we perform a cross-sectional regression using the firm-specific time-series means of the 
variables. As in Model 2, the coefficient on LSI (0.095) is significantly positive, but it is 13% greater 
in magnitude than in the former model. This finding suggests a strong cross-sectional relation between 
labor skills and cash holdings. 
In Model 4, we employ a cross-sectional specification that resembles Model 3 but uses 
aggregate data at the industry level. That is, instead of using firm-specific, time-series averages, we use 
industry time-series averages, where industries are defined by three-digit industry SIC codes. The 
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coefficient on LSI (0.028) remains positive and significant, indicating that industry-level cash holdings 
are determined by differences in the reliance on skilled labor across industries.  
In Models 5 and 6, we perform two fixed effects regressions to control for firm and industry 
(three-digit SIC codes) fixed effects, respectively. Despite the persistence of the labor skill level over 
time,7 we include these fixed effects to address a concern that not controlling for unobserved time-
invariant firm- or industry-level factors (i.e., heterogeneity) may lead to a spurious correlation between 
LSI and cash holdings. The results show that the coefficient on LSI remains positive and significant at 
the 1% level, although its magnitude is smaller than in the baseline regression (Model 2). Comparing 
these results with those for Models 24, we conclude that the variation in cash holdings is mainly 
driven by cross-sectional differences in LSI. 
Overall, our findings are qualitatively similar across a variety of model specifications: LSI has 
a robust and positive impact on cash holdings. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that 
firms relying heavily on skilled workers hold higher cash balances so as to follow an optimal labor 
retention policy, as implied by the higher LACs they face.  
4.2 Addressing Endogeneity Concerns 
A concern with our regression results so far is the potential endogeneity of LSI. A firm’s 
dependence on skilled labor may be related to unobservable factors affecting its cash policy, leading 
to a spurious relation between LSI and cash holdings. Our fixed effects regressions in Models 5 and 6 
of Table 4 control for firm and industry heterogeneity and thus alleviate to an extent the omitted-
variable bias. Reverse causality is another possibility. A liquid balance sheet may improve a firm’s 
ability to recruit skilled workers from the labor market, meaning that cash holdings may affect the 
firm’s dependence on skilled labor. In the following subsections, we attempt to establish the causal 
link between labor skills and cash holdings through three different strategies.  
7 Our (unreported) analysis shows that LSI is rather persistent, displaying more variation across industries than 
in the time series.  
14 
4.2.1 Subsamples of Industries with Similar Characteristics 
To address the possibility that the relation between LSI and cash holdings may be confounded 
by unobserved firm and industry heterogeneity, we examine subsamples of relatively similar 
industries and firms. First, we remove from our sample low-skill firms, which are likely to differ 
significantly from their high-skill counterparts in terms of unobserved characteristics, and focus on a 
subsample of the latter firms, that is, firms operating in industries with above-median LSI. Next, we 
look at a subsample of firms in the manufacturing sector (with SIC codes between 2000 and 3999) as 
well as a more focused subsample of manufacturing and high-skill firms. By examining relatively 
similar firms in a single sector, our tests reduce industry heterogeneity and help alleviate the omitted-
variable bias. The results reported in Table 5 show that the coefficient on LSI continues to be 
significant for these subsamples of relatively similar firms, suggesting that the positive relation 
between LSI and cash is unlikely to be affected by heterogeneity bias. 
4.2.2 Propensity Score Matching 
To control for observable differences in firm and industry attributes, we next perform a PSM 
analysis. We match firms with above-median LSI with those with below-median LSI on year, industry, 
and all the control variables from our baseline regression.8 By matching on industry (using two-digit 
SIC codes),9 we can also remove unobserved industry heterogeneity that may be correlated with our 
measure of labor skills. The results in Table 6 suggest that, as expected, firms with high labor skills 
hold more cash than propensity-score-matched firms with low labor skills (0.261 versus 0.177), the 
difference (0.084) being significant at the 1% level. This finding holds whether the standard errors are 
bootstrapped (Column 3) or clustered at the industry level (Column 4). 
8 In all specifications, we apply the nearest neighbor matching algorithm, with replacement and common 
support. Standard errors are either bootstrapped to take into account the fact that propensity scores are estimated 
rather than known (Abadie and Imbens 2006) or clustered at the industry level. The balancing property is 
satisfied in all models. 
9 We use two-digit SIC codes in our matching to retain some variation in LSI, which is constructed for each 
industry according to its three-digit SIC code. 
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As in Table 5, we further look at subsamples of industries and firms that have reasonably 
similar characteristics. That is, we match manufacturing firms with above-median LSI with those in the 
same sector with below-median LSI. We also perform the matching for a subsample of firms in high-
labor-skill industries as well as for separate subsamples of positive- and zero-R&D firms. Using the 
subsamples of positive-R&D firms and high-skill industries enables us to focus on firms that rely 
relatively more heavily on skilled workers, for which we expect the impact of LSI on cash holdings to 
be most pronounced.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, all sub-sample results exhibit significant differences in the 
cash balances of high- and low-labor-skill firms operating in the same (manufacturing) or similar 
(high-labor-skill) sectors and having similar characteristics (positive or zero R&D expenses). 
Specifically, the differences are strongly significant when the standard errors are bootstrapped; they 
remain significant at the 5% (10%) level for high-skill industries and positive-R&D firms 
(manufacturing industries and zero-R&D firms) when the standard errors are clustered at the industry 
level. In terms of magnitude, these differences vary between 0.019 and 0.106, being smallest for the 
subsample of zero-R&D firms and largest for the subsample of manufacturing firms. We note, 
however, that in relative terms, the difference (0.019) in the cash ratio of high- and low-skill zero-
R&D firms represents 14.2% (16.5%) of the mean cash ratio of zero-R&D firms with above-(below-
)median LSI, which is economically significant. 
4.2.3 Exogenous Shock to Labor Markets: Hurricane Katrina 
Our final strategy exploits an exogenous shock to the labor supply that occurred as a result of 
labor migration from New Orleans to Houston following Hurricane Katrina. Based on Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data for November 2005 through August 2006, McIntosh (2008) reports a 
figure of between 100,000 and 150,000 such evacuees, representing a 3%–4% increase in the Houston 
population. This exogenous labor supply shock was likely to make Houston’s local labor market 
thicker by increasing the number of effective participants. Thick local labor markets are associated 
with lower LACs primarily for two reasons. First, they increase the probability of firms filling 
vacancies, thus reducing search, selection, and hiring costs (Moretti 2011). Second, they lead to better 
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quality employee-firm matches, which are typically associated with longer employee tenures 
(Jovanovic and Rob 1989), and hence lower labor turnover and LACs (e.g., fewer productivity 
disruptions). Since Hurricane Katrina induced an exogenous change in LACs as opposed to a change 
in potential omitted variables, our experiment is designed to capture the impact of labor skills on cash 
holdings through the LACs channel.  
We report the results from our experiment based on Hurricane Katrina in Table 7. Our 
treatment group consists of firms headquartered in the Houston metropolitan area, while our control 
group consists of propensity-score-matched firms headquartered in neighboring metropolitan areas 
that were not affected by Katrina, either directly or indirectly (McIntosh 2008).10 We match firms on 
year, industry, and all covariates. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of one (zero) for the 
year following (preceding) Hurricane Katrina. We study a short window around Hurricane Katrina 
since several studies report a substantial reverse flow of migrants a few years after Katrina (Groen and 
Polivka 2008, 2010; Paxson and Rouse 2008). Given the unprecedented devastation caused by 
Hurricane Katrina, the declining economy in New Orleans, even pre-evacuation, and the uncertainty 
about the pace of recovery (e.g., Vigdor 2008), we assume that Houston-based firms might not have 
anticipated this significant reverse flow, which, therefore, should not have affected their decision 
making at the time of the influx of evacuees into Houston. 
10 Following McIntosh (2008), our treatment group consists of firms headquartered in the Houston metropolitan 
area (Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX), whereas our control group consists of propensity-score-matched 
firms headquartered in other metropolitan areas of Texas and of neighboring states (Arkansas, New Mexico, and 
Oklahoma, but not Louisiana) that were not affected by Katrina, either directly or indirectly. Metropolitan areas 
that were in the direct path of the storm and experienced flooding or catastrophic, extensive, or moderate 
structural damage include Mobile, AL; Baton Rouge and New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA; and Gulfport-
Biloxi and Jackson, MS (Gabe et al. 2005). Indirectly affected areas are those that experienced more than a 1% 
gross population increase due to the migration of evacuees, and include Huntsville, AL; Fort Walton Beach-
Crestview-Destin, Naples-Marco Island, and Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL; and Lafayette, Lake Charles, and 
Monroe, LA. 
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In Model 1 of Table 7, we run a difference-in-differences specification. The Houston*Post 
coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that the change in cash holdings from pre- to post-
Katrina was more negative for firms headquartered in the Houston metropolitan area than for matched 
firms headquartered in neighboring metropolitan areas. This result is consistent with the expected 
impact of the increased labor supply on cash holdings through the reduction in LACs, as described 
above.  
Next, we examine the net effect of the Katrina-induced migration on cash holdings by 
Houston-based firms compared to the control group for different skill levels. We argue that the 
Katrina-induced migration to Houston should have affected the LACs of highly skilled workers more 
than those of low-skilled workers for two reasons. First, although the supply of applicants for low-
skilled jobs appears to have increased proportionally more than that for highly skilled jobs (Gabe et al. 
2005; De Silva et al. 2010), the difference between the proportional increases in the supply of the two 
types of applicants is likely to have been small (McIntosh 2008). Accordingly, we anticipate that the 
LACs of both groups of workers would have experienced comparable percentage decreases. Still, 
given that the LACs of skilled workers are considerably higher in magnitude than those of unskilled 
workers (see footnote 1), modest and comparable percentage reductions in the LACs of both groups 
would have led to a much greater decrease in absolute terms in the level of the highly skilled workers’ 
LACs.  
Second, the increased thickness of Houston’s local labor market post-Katrina is likely to have 
reduced the probability of an employer not finding a qualified worker, and to have improved the 
quality of employee-employer matching more for specialized employees than for manual laborers 
(Moretti 2011; Bleakley and Lin 2012). To the extent that specialized employees (manual laborers) 
have higher (lower) skills, the Katrina-induced exogenous increase in the labor supply in Houston 
should have had a more pronounced impact on the LACs of highly skilled workers than low-skilled 
workers. This argument suggests that our anticipation above of similar reductions (in relative terms) 
in the LACs of both groups of workers is conservative. That is, it implies that the percentage decrease 
in highly skilled workers’ LACs is likely to have been greater than the percentage decrease in low-
skilled workers’ LACs. Overall, this line of reasoning further strengthens our conjecture that, 
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following Hurricane Katrina, the LACs of skilled workers based in Houston should have experienced 
a considerably larger decline in absolute terms than those of less skilled workers. 
The above arguments both suggest that the negative impact of the Katrina-induced labor 
migration on the cash holdings of Houston-based firms should be more pronounced for those with a 
greater share of skilled workers. To test this conjecture, in Model 2 of Table 7, we run a triple-
difference (difference-in-difference-in-differences) specification with continuous treatment (De Silva 
et al. 2010; Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian 2013). We find that the coefficient on the triple 
interaction term (LSI*Houston*Post) is negative and highly significant, which is consistent with our 
prediction. 
An alternative explanation of this result could be that the Katrina-induced migration not only 
reduced LACs but also affected wages and employment in the Houston area, thus reducing Houston-
based firms’ wage bill and cash reserves. However, existing evidence of the impact of Hurricane 
Katrina on labor market outcomes for low- and highly skilled workers in the Houston area is, at best, 
mixed (McIntosh 2008; De Silva et al. 2010). De Silva et al. (2010), for instance, use establishment-
level data and find that post-Katrina the wages of firms in low-skill industries in the Houston area 
experienced a 0.7% drop relative to firms in high-skill industries when compared to a control group of 
the same industries in Dallas; this finding suggests that the wage channel is inconsistent with our 
evidence of a stronger Katrina impact for high-skill firms in Houston. Moreover, the related 
immigration literature generally shows that migration has a small, if sometimes insignificant, effect on 
wages and employment in local labor markets (e.g., Card 1990, 2005; Friedberg 2001; Dustmann, 
Fabbri, and Preston 2005; Basso and Peri 2015). Although it is difficult to completely rule out the 
wage/employment channel, given the inconclusive and weak evidence in prior research of the impact 
of migration on wages and employment, we argue that the LACs mechanism is the main mechanism 
driving our results. 
4.3 Heterogeneity in the Impact of Labor Skills on Cash Holdings 
We next examine potential heterogeneity in the relation between labor skills and cash 
holdings by conditioning on (a) variations in labor market frictions associated with LACs and (b) 
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variations in capital market frictions relating to firms’ degree of financial constraint. Specifically, we 
first study the effect of LSI on cash holdings when firms face exogenous variations in downward 
(firing) and upward (hiring) adjustment costs. We then examine how the LSI–cash relation is affected 
by differences in firms’ precautionary motive for holding cash.  
4.3.1 Downward versus Upward Adjustment Costs 
4.3.1.1 Variation in Firing Costs 
To proxy for differences in a firm’s costs of adjusting its labor demand downward, we follow 
Serfling (2016) and exploit an exogenous variation in firing costs across U.S. states following the 
state-level recognition of wrongful discharge laws since the 1970s.11 WDL measures the strength of 
WDLs in a state and is constructed by summing three distinct dummy variables for each of the three 
WDL exceptions, where each dummy is set equal to one if the firm is in a state that has adopted the 
exception in question and zero otherwise.12 Since the passage of WDLs increases firing costs, we 
expect firms in such states to have greater incentives to minimize labor turnover. Consequently, they 
have a stronger precautionary motive to build up cash reserves that allow them to cover any future 
cash flow shortfalls and avoid costly layoffs.  
Moreover, we argue that the variation in firing costs due to WDLs should increase with the 
labor skill level. First, prior research shows that WDLs do not generally apply to temporary 
employees and in particular unionized workers, who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement 
(Miles 2000; Autor 2003). In contrast, WDLs typically pertain to full-time or nonunionized 
employees (Serfling 2016). Based on this argument, and to the extent that low-skilled workers are 
11 WDLs are common-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. They can raise hurdles against firms’ 
wrongful discharge of employees, making it more costly to dismiss workers. There are three exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine: the public policy exception, the implied contract exception, and the good faith 
exception. A state can choose to adopt none to all of these exceptions; see Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) 
for a detailed description of these laws.  
12 In further analysis, we follow Serfling (2016) and focus on the good faith exception, arguably the most 
effective of the WDL exceptions, and obtain qualitatively similar results. 
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likely to be unionized while highly skilled workers typically are not, we expect the positive effect of 
WDLs on firing costs to be more pronounced for firms that rely more on highly skilled employees. 
Second, empirical evidence shows that WDLs not only matter more for skilled workers, but also these 
workers are more likely to litigate (Autor, Donohue, and Schwab 2006), thus increasing potential 
lawsuit costs for their employers. Dertouzos, Holland, and Ebener (1988) study WDL cases in 
California during 19801986 and report that around 54% of plaintiffs held executive or managerial 
positions. This finding implies that high-skill firms in states that recognize WDLs are likely to have 
higher litigation risk than low-skill firms in the same states. Furthermore, WDL trials can be costly for 
firms since there is a high probability of plaintiffs winning, leading to substantial compensatory 
damages. For example, Dertouzos, Holland, and Ebener (1988) document that plaintiffs prevailed in 
68% of the WDL trials in California between 1980 and 1986 and were awarded on average $650,000, 
or more than $1.3 million in 2012 dollars. Importantly, the earnings and age of the plaintiff explain 
more than 30% of the case-to-case variation in these damages. Since earnings and LSI are positively 
related (Murphy and Welch 1992), we expect firms with high shares of skilled workers to face higher 
compensatory damages than those with low shares of skilled workers.  
Overall, we conjecture that the passage of WDLs should have a significant and positive effect 
on the firing costs of firms, hence providing them with a greater incentive to hold precautionary cash. 
Furthermore, this effect should be stronger among high-skill firms because they are more likely to 
employ a larger share of workers affected by these laws, face higher litigation risk, and subsequently 
contend with higher lawsuit costs. To capture this effect, we include an interaction term between WDL 
and LSI and anticipate its coefficient to be positive. In Table 8, Model 1, we show that LSI has a 
significantly positive impact on cash holdings, which supports our main hypothesis. Importantly, 
consistent with our prediction above, the interaction term (LSI*WDL) is also positive and significant, 
which indicates a positive marginal effect of WDL on the LSI–cash holdings relation.13  
13 Although the stand-alone coefficient on WDL is negative and insignificant, the partial effect of WDLs on cash 
holdings, which is the sum of the coefficient on WDL and that on the interaction term (LSI*WDL) multiplied by 
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4.3.1.2 Variation in Hiring Costs 
Next, we examine the impact of hiring credits (i.e., subsidies paid to employers that hire 
workers) on the labor skills–cash holdings relation. Our analysis is motivated by Neumark and 
Grijalva’s (forthcoming) evidence that some state subsidy programs can be effective in boosting firm 
employment.14 Although there is great variety in the provision and standards of state-level economic 
development subsidy programs (Mattera et al. 2011), the majority of these subsidy programs requires 
job creation as a condition for firms to receive any form of subsidy. We follow Mattera et al.’s (2011) 
systematic approach to identifying high-quality hiring-credit programs. Their method involves scoring 
these programs, with a view to ranking them in terms of perceived quality: A higher score assigned to 
these programs implies higher efficiency in creating high-quality jobs. Using those (state-level) 
ratings, we construct a hiring credit dummy variable that indicates the existence of high-quality job 
creation subsidies in the state in which a firm is headquartered. We conjecture that, in states with 
these high-quality hiring-credit programs, the costs of hiring will be lower, making the precautionary 
savings motive weaker.  
We further predict that the decrease in hiring costs resulting from the availability of high-
quality subsidy programs will increase in importance with firms’ reliance on highly skilled labor. This 
is because a large number of those subsidy programs has wage requirements, under which firms are 
either allowed to receive hiring credits only if they have wage thresholds in place or the level of 
credits they receive depends on wage thresholds. These thresholds vary from minimum wage to well 
LSI, is positive. Moreover, in further regression analysis (untabulated), we find the coefficient on WDL to be 
significantly positive when the interaction term (LSI*WDL) is excluded from the model. These results are 
consistent with our conjecture regarding the impact of WDLs on cash holdings and recent research on the 
impact of employment protection laws on financial leverage (Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin 2015; Serfling 2016).  
14 While earlier evidence shows that hiring credits are less effective than worker subsidies (e.g., Hamersma 
2008, 2011), recent studies argue that broad-based subsidy programs can help spur job creation in the short run, 
especially after periods of severe recession; see Neumark (2013) for a review. Recent evidence also suggests the 
effectiveness of hiring credits in France (Cahuc, Carcillo, and Barbanchon 2015). 
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above average state or sector wages, which, for some programs, reach 300% of mean wages. Given 
the significantly positive correlation between wages and worker skill level (Murphy and Welch 1992), 
subsidy programs requiring high wage thresholds are likely to target job creation in firms that require 
skilled labor. Importantly, such programs are given a higher score according to Mattera et al.’s (2011) 
rating system. In other words, a program that targets the creation of skilled jobs (i.e., has higher wage 
thresholds) receives a higher score. We therefore anticipate that high-quality hiring-credit programs 
decrease hiring costs more for firms with greater reliance on skilled workers. To capture this effect, 
we create an interaction term between the hiring credits variable and LSI. We expect the coefficient on 
this interaction term to be negative. The regression results in Model 2 of Table 8 provide strong 
evidence in support of our prediction. The coefficient on the interaction term between hiring credits 
and labor skills is indeed negative and highly significant.15  
Finally, in Model 3 of Table 8, we include all additional regressors examined in Models 1 and 
2 above (i.e., variables proxying for differences in firing costs as well as those proxying for 
differences in hiring costs). We find that after controlling for variation in both WDLs and hiring 
credits, LSI remains significantly positive, which is consistent with our argument that labor skills are 
an important proxy for all components of LACs (Oi 1962; Hamermesh and Pfann 1996) and suggests 
that the impact of LSI on cash is above and beyond that of firing and hiring costs. More importantly, 
we continue to document strong evidence that the LSI–cash holdings relation varies with the strength 
of labor protection and the quality of hiring-credit programs in the state in which the firm is 
headquartered. Taken together with the results in Models 1 and 2, these findings suggest that the 
impact of labor skills on cash holdings is more important in labor markets with higher downward 
adjustment costs and less pronounced in labor markets with lower upward adjustment costs. 
15 The partial effect of Hiring credits on cash holdings is negative as the coefficient on the interaction term, 
LSI*Hiring credits, is negative and highly significant. When we exclude this interaction term, the stand-alone 
coefficient on Hiring credits becomes significantly negative. These results are consistent with the prediction that 
hiring credits can reduce the costs of hiring and lower the precautionary savings motive. 
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4.3.2 The Effect of Financial Constraints 
The precautionary motive for holding cash is most relevant for financially constrained firms 
(Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004, 2011; Han and Qiu 2007) since the use of cash as a buffer 
to avoid costly labor adjustments in response to cash flow shocks is more important when financial 
constraints are binding. We thus predict that the positive relation between labor skills and cash 
holdings is more pronounced when firms face greater frictions in capital markets. To test this 
prediction, we split our sample into constrained and unconstrained firms. We measure the degree of 
financial constraints using three different proxies: the size and age (SA) index (Hadlock and Pierce 
2010), the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index (Kaplan and Zingales 1997), and the Whited and Wu 
(WW) index (Whited and Wu 2006). We define firms with above-median scores on the SA, KZ, and 
WW indexes as constrained and those with below-median scores as unconstrained. 
Table 9 shows how the relation between firms’ reliance on skilled labor and their cash 
holdings varies with their degree of financial constraint. Models 1 and 2 report the results for the two 
subsamples of constrained and unconstrained firms according to the SA index. In line with the 
precautionary savings motive, the coefficient on LSI is higher for constrained firms (0.093) than for 
unconstrained firms (0.061); the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Models 3 
through 6 reveal similar patterns when we proxy for financial constraints using the KZ or WW index. 
In sum, our findings are consistent with the prediction that the positive impact of LSI on cash holdings 
is more pronounced for constrained firms. 
5. Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses
5.1 Labor Adjustment Costs or Intangible Capital? 
Firms relying on skilled labor may also have substantial “intangible capital.” Specifically, 
these firms may have important intangible assets created by R&D expenditures as well as human and 
organizational capital knowledge embedded in their skilled workers (Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim 
2013; Klasa et al. 2015). Consequently, cash holdings may be positively related to LSI through the 
intangible capital channel. For instance, to the extent that high-labor-skill firms wish to protect their 
valuable intangible assets, and given uncertainty in the future cash flows generated by such assets, 
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these firms may have a strong precautionary motive for holding cash. While this prediction is 
consistent with our central hypothesis regarding the direction of the relation between LSI and cash 
holdings, it is based on a mechanism that operates through the protection of intangible capital rather 
than LACs. Although there is no indisputable way of disentangling the two channels, since intangible 
capital and labor skills should be highly correlated, we conduct additional tests to show that the 
impact of skilled labor on cash holdings is above and beyond the effect of intangible capital. 
First, we examine a subsample of firms that have zero R&D expenditures. We argue that 
firms reporting zero R&D must have fewer intangible assets and, as a result, less incentive to hold 
precautionary cash to protect such assets. By focusing on firms for which the risk of losing intangible 
assets is relatively low, we can isolate the effect of labor skills on cash holdings that is directly caused 
by LACs considerations. We note that, in our PSM analysis presented above, we report results from a 
matched sample of high- versus low-skill zero-R&D firms that are consistent with our conjectures on 
the impact of skilled labor on cash holdings. In addition to these results, in Model 1 of Table 10, we 
report the findings for the subsample of zero-R&D firms using our main (unmatched) sample. We 
find the coefficient on LSI to be significant and positive at 1% for these firms, which supports our 
central argument based on the LACs mechanism. More importantly, in Model 4, we investigate a 
subsample of firms with zero R&D expenditures and a high share of skilled labor. Using this 
restricted subsample, we contend that a significant difference between the cash balances of high-skill 
firms and those employing less highly skilled labor should be mainly due to variation in the LACs 
associated with these skill levels. In line with this prediction, we find that the coefficient on LSI 
remains positive and significant for this restricted subsample.   
A potential limitation of the above analysis is that investments in R&D are not an 
encompassing measure of intangible capital. To address this concern, we follow the economics 
literature (Lev and Radhakrishnan 2005; Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel 2009; Corrado and Hulten 2010) 
and recent finance research (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013; Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim 2013; 
Peters and Taylor 2017) and employ a more comprehensive measure of intangible capital. In 
particular, we consider both internally created and externally purchased intangible capital as in Peters 
and Taylor (2017). We measure the stock of internally created intangible capital as the sum of 
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knowledge capital and organizational capital. We estimate the stock of knowledge capital by 
accumulating past R&D spending using the perpetual inventory method.  The stock of organizational 
capital is estimated by accumulating a fraction of past selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses using the same method.16 Following Peters and Taylor (2017), we use the balance sheet item 
“Intangible Assets” to measure externally purchased intangible capital. 
Similar to our earlier analysis for zero-R&D firms, in the remainder of Table 10, we present 
results for the whole sample (Models 23) and for the subsample of high-skill firms (Models 56). 
We perform two tests. First, in Model 2, we check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of the 
comprehensive measure of intangible capital as an additional control. We find that intangible capital 
is positively and significantly related to cash holdings, which is in line with Falato, Kadyrzhanova, 
and Sim (2013). However, controlling for intangible capital does not affect either the statistical or the 
economic significance of the coefficient on LSI. Second, in Model 3, we examine a subsample of 
firms that have low intangible capital (bottom 30th percentile). We find the coefficient on LSI to be 
positive and significant at 1% for these firms, which supports our central argument based on the LACs 
channel. The results remain qualitatively unchanged in Models 56 when we rerun the regressions for 
the subsample of high-skill firms. 
Overall, the above tests show that the positive relationship between LSI and cash holdings 
continues to hold when we control for a comprehensive measure of intangible capital or concentrate 
on firms with potentially limited intangible capital. We conclude that our results remain consistent 
with a LACs explanation and thus are unlikely to be driven only by the intangible capital channel. 
5.2 Alternative Measures of Cash Holdings and Labor Skills 
While the cash-to-total assets ratio is the most traditional measure of cash holdings, some 
studies use alternative definitions (e.g., Opler et al. 1999; Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina 2009). 
16 Our approach of using the perpetual inventory method to capitalize R&D and SG&A expenses is similar to 
that in recent papers (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013; Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim 2013; Peters and Taylor 
2017). A similar method is used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to capitalize R&D expenses. 
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To establish the robustness of our results, we replicate our main regressions using two alternative 
measures of cash holdings, namely, the natural logarithm of cash and short-term investments, scaled 
by book assets net of cash and short-term investments, and the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash 
and short-term investments to total sales. Untabulated results confirm that the coefficient on LSI is 
positive and highly significant.  
We also consider an alternative measure of labor skills, which we construct similarly to our 
original LSI. The only difference is that, instead of using the O*NET skill zones to proxy for the level 
of skill of an occupation (Zj in the original LSI), we use the occupation’s average hourly wage. We use 
the OES dataset to collect data on wages at the occupational level. In untabulated analysis, we rerun 
our baseline regression and find that the coefficient on LSI remains positive and highly significant. 
Overall, we conclude that our findings are robust to alternative definitions of cash holdings and LSI. 
5.3 Further Tests 
We conduct a series of additional tests that showcase the robustness of our main result and 
offer more insights on the relations between skilled labor and cash holdings as well as a related 
corporate policy, namely, financial leverage. To conserve space, we report and discuss the results 
from these tests in the Internet Appendix.  
First, we control for several important determinants of cash holdings identified by recent 
papers, which may also be related to our measure of labor skills. In doing so, we further mitigate the 
potential omitted variable bias and rule out alternative explanations for the effect of labor skills on 
cash holdings. The results in Table IA.1 of the Internet Appendix show that the impact of skilled labor 
on cash holdings remains positive and significant after controlling for the industry unionization rate 
(Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina 2009), product market characteristics, such as industry 
concentration and product market fluidity (Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell 2007; Hoberg, Phillips, 
and Prabhala 2014), refinancing risk (Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell 2014), and foreign tax burden 
(Foley et al. 2007). Second, we examine the impacts of labor skills on the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
(Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004) and the market value of cash (Faulkender and Wang 2006). 
The results in Tables IA.2 and IA.3 of the Internet Appendix suggest that firms with a higher share of 
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skilled labor have a higher propensity to save cash from their cash flows and enjoy a higher market 
value of cash, which further highlights the importance of cash reserves for high-skill firms. Finally, 
we test the proposition that high-skill firms, which face significant LACs, should adopt conservative 
financial policies by maintaining not only high cash holdings but also low financial leverage. The 
results reported in Table IA.4 are consistent with this conjecture and recent evidence on the impact of 
firing costs on capital structure (e.g., Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin 2015; Serfling 2016). 
6. Conclusion
We investigate the impact of a firm’s reliance on skilled labor on its cash management policy. 
Firms differ in their degree of reliance on skilled workers and face substantial LACs that increase 
with their workers’ skill level. This labor market friction incentivizes firms to optimally keep their 
employment stable. However, following an optimal labor retention policy reduces firms’ ability to 
adjust labor demand in response to cash flow shocks, exposing them to future cash flow shortfalls. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that firms with a high share of skilled workers have a precautionary motive 
to hold cash reserves, which safeguard them against unexpected cash flow fluctuations while allowing 
them to keep labor turnover optimally low.  
In line with this hypothesis, we document novel evidence that our labor skill index, measured 
at the industry level, has a positive and significant impact on firms’ cash holdings. Furthermore, the 
impact of labor skills on cash holdings is robust to a variety of model specifications, alternative 
measures of the variables of interest, and tests controlling for alternative explanations. To mitigate 
endogeneity concerns, we employ three different strategies based on subsamples of relatively similar 
industries and firms, PSM, and a quasi-natural experiment associated with exogenous variation in 
LACs. While it is hard to fully rule out endogeneity, taken together, these tests provide consistent 
results, all pointing to a causal effect of labor skills on cash holdings. 
We next examine variation in the LSIcash holdings relation. We find the impact of labor 
skills on cash to be stronger in labor markets with higher downward adjustment costs and weaker in 
labor markets with lower upward adjustment costs. We also observe that the positive relation between 
LSI and cash continues to hold after controlling for exogenous differences in hiring and firing costs, 
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suggesting that the effect of LSI, as a broader measure of LACs, on cash is above and beyond that of 
individual proxies for LACs (i.e., employment protection laws or hiring credits). Furthermore, 
consistent with the precautionary savings motive, we find the effect of LSI on cash holdings to be 
stronger for firms that are financially constrained. Additional analysis shows that firms that rely more 
on skilled labor have a higher marginal value of cash and tend to save more precautionary cash from 
their cash flows. 
Finally, we address a concern that our results may be driven primarily by the intangible 
capital channel rather than LACs; under this alternative channel, for example, high-labor-skill firms 
would build up cash reserves mainly to protect valuable intangible assets rather than skilled labor. 
Although the two channels are not mutually exclusive, our analysis shows that the impact of labor 
skills on cash holdings is consistent with the LACs mechanism and not simply due to the intangible 
capital channel.  
Overall, we show that high-skill firms respond to high LACs by adopting conservative cash 
policies. Our findings suggest that labor heterogeneity, and in particular the skill level of workers, is 
an important determinant of corporate cash holdings. 
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Table 1. Labor Skill Levels across Different Industries 
This table presents examples of industries with the least and most reliance on skilled labor. Our sample consists 
of 68,057 firm–year observations covering the period 19992012. We measure a firm’s reliance on skilled labor 
using the following index: ܮܵܫ௜	 ൌ ∑ ቀாೕ೔ா೔ ∗ ௝ܼቁ
ை௝ୀଵ , where Eji is the number of employees in industry i working in 
occupation j, Ei is the total number of employees in industry i, and O is the total number of occupations in industry i. Finally, Zj is the U.S. Department of Labor’s O*NET program classification of occupations based on 
skill level; this program classifies occupations into five job zones, ranging from job zone 1, which includes 
occupations that require little or no skill, to job zone 5, which consists of occupations that require extensive 
skills. By construction, LSI ranges from 1 to 5: low (high) values imply that the majority of workers in the 
industry require few (extensive) skills in order to perform their jobs. 
Industry Reliance on Skilled Labor Index (LSI) 
Full sample 2.471 
Least Reliance on Skilled Labor: 
Gasoline stations 1.281 
Restaurants and other eating places  1.306 
Services to buildings 1.371 
Amusement parks and arcades 1.448 
Grocery stores 1.462 
Department stores 1.637 
Footwear manufacturing 1.735 
Most Reliance on Skilled Labor: 
Legal services 3.318 
Architectural, engineering, and related services 3.306 
Colleges, universities, and professional schools 3.226 
Offices of health practitioners 3.194 
Scientific R&D services 3.187 
Electronic and precision equipment  3.134 
Software publishers 3.118 
Accounting and tax preparation services 3.047 
Management and technical consulting services 2.966 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the dependent variable (cash holdings), our key variable (LSI), and a set 
of control variables. Our sample consists of 68,057 firm–year observations covering the period 19992012. 
Cash holdings are the ratio of cash and short-term investments (che) to total assets (at). The reliance on skilled 
labor is defined in Table 1. Cash flow is earnings after interest, dividends, and tax but before depreciation (oibdp 
 xint  txt  dvc), scaled by the book value of total assets (at). Net working capital is measured as working 
capital (wcap) minus cash (che), scaled by total assets (at). Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital 
expenditures (capx) to total assets (at). Leverage is long-term debt (dltt) plus debt in current liabilities (dlc), 
scaled by total assets (at). Acquisitions are defined as the ratio of acquisitions (aqc) to total assets (at). The 
market-to-book ratio is defined as the book value of assets (at) plus the market value of common equity (prcc_f 
* csho) minus the book value of common equity (ceq), scaled by the book value of assets (at). Size is measured
as the logarithm of the book value of assets (at) in 1999 dollars. To measure industry cash flow volatility, we 
calculate for each firm–year the standard deviation of (firm-level) cash flow to assets for the previous five years. 
Industry cash flow volatility (Ind. CF volatility) is then calculated as the average of the firm cash flow standard 
deviations for each industry, classified by two-digit SIC codes. R&D expenditures is the ratio of R&D expenses 
(xrd) to net sales (sale), and is set equal to zero when R&D expenses (xrd) are missing. Dividend dummy is a 
dummy variable set equal to one in years in which a firm pays common dividends (dvc), and zero otherwise.  
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q4 Std. Dev. 
Dependent variable: 
Cash holdings 0.198 0.029 0.105 0.290 0.228 
Variable of interest: 
LSI 2.471 2.145 2.443 2.812 0.501 
Control variables: 
Cash flow  -0.190 -0.072 0.051 0.101 0.979 
Net working capital  -0.148 -0.087 0.017 0.144 1.109 
Capital expenditures 0.060 0.015 0.033 0.071 0.077 
Leverage  0.320 0.026 0.191 0.372 0.620 
Acquisitions 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.060 
Market-to-book  3.043 1.088 1.512 2.493 6.034 
Size  4.940 3.279 5.008 6.668 2.531 
Ind. CF volatility  1.345 0.180 0.835 1.689 1.746 
R&D expenditures 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.082 2.694 
Dividend dummy 0.252 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.434 
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Table 3. Univariate Analysis: Firm Characteristics across Different Labor Skill Levels 
This table reports the mean firm characteristics for the full sample and two subsamples of firms according to 
their degree of reliance on skilled labor (i.e., firms with above- and below-median LSI scores). The dependent 
and control variables are defined in Table 2. The sample period is 19992012. N denotes the number of 
observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Overall 
sample 



























Cash holdings 0.198 0.261 0.136 *** *** 
Control variables: 
Cash flow -0.190 -0.271 -0.109 *** *** 
Net working capital -0.148 -0.208 -0.088 *** *** 
Capital expenditures  0.060 0.056 0.063 *** 
Leverage 0.320 0.311 0.329 *** 
Acquisitions 0.022 0.022 0.021 *** 
Market-to-book  3.043 3.529 2.553 *** *** 
Size 4.940 4.559 5.322 *** *** 
Industry CF volatility 1.345 1.590 1.110 *** 
R&D expenditures 0.491 0.841 0.142 *** 
Dividend dummy 0.252 0.175 0.329 *** *** 
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Table 4. The Relation between Cash Holdings and Skilled Labor 
This table reports regression results regarding the impact of firms’ reliance on skilled labor on their cash 
holdings. In Model 1, we regress cash holdings on the control variables. In Model 2, we include LSI as an 
additional explanatory variable. In Model 3, we perform a cross-sectional regression using the firm-specific 
time-series means of the variables. Model 4 is similar to Model 3 except that we use industry averages instead of 
firm averages. Models 5 and 6 control for firm and industry (three-digit SIC codes) fixed effects. All regressions 
include year dummies except for Models 3 and 4. All variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2. The p-values in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the industry level, except in Model 4, where the p-
values are based on non-clustered heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 OLS Across firm 
Across 
industry Fixed effects 
Variables (1)        (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       














































































































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes No 
Industry fixed effect No No No No No Yes 
Observations  68,057 68,057 10,760 286 68,057 68,057 




Table 5. Cash Holdings and Skilled Labor: Subsamples of Industries with Similar 
Characteristics 
This table reports regression results regarding the impact of firms’ reliance on skilled labor on 
their cash holdings for industries with reasonably similar characteristics. In Model 1, we focus 
on industries with above-median LSI. In Model 2, we focus on manufacturing industries (i.e., 
firms with SIC codes between 2,000 and 3,999). Model 3 reports the results for the subsample 
of manufacturing industries with above-median LSI. All regressions include year dummies. All 
variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the industry level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 



















































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 34,017 34,326 17,455 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.34 0.30 
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Table 6. Cash Holdings and Skilled Labor: Propensity Score Matching 
This table presents our findings for matched samples with varying labor skill levels. It reports the results of 
the propensity score matching used to test for differences in cash holdings between firms with above-median 
LSI and matched firms with below-median LSI, using the nearest-neighbor matching technique. We match 
firms on industry (two-digit SIC codes), year, and all the control variables from our baseline specification. 
We report the results for the whole sample and for subsamples of industries and firms with reasonably similar 
characteristics (manufacturing industries, high-skill industries, positive-R&D firms, and zero-R&D firms), 
using the median level of LSI within the subsample to split firms. Manufacturing industries are defined as 
industries with SIC codes between 2,000 and 3,999. High-skill industries are defined as industries with 
above-median LSI. All variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 




















    
Whole Sample: 
 
   
 Cash holdings 0.261 0.177 0.084*** 0.084** 
 Observations 34,017 34,024   
Manufacturing Industries: 
 
   







 Observations 16,968 17,014   
High-skill Industries: 
 
   












   












   















Table 7. Exogenous Shock to Labor Markets: The Effect of Hurricane Katrina 
This table shows how the relation between firms’ reliance on skilled labor and their cash holdings was affected 
by an exogenous shock to the labor supply resulting from labor migration from New Orleans to Houston 
following Hurricane Katrina. Houston is a dummy variable that takes the value one for companies 
headquartered in the Houston metropolitan area, and zero for matched companies headquartered in neighboring 
metropolitan areas that were not impacted by Katrina, either directly or indirectly. Post is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one (zero) for the year following (preceding) Katrina. We match firms on year, industry (three-
digit SIC codes in Model 1 and two-digit SIC codes in Model 2), and all the control variables from our baseline 
specification. All variables, except the two dummy variables listed above, are defined in Tables 1 and 2. The p-
values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Katrina effect 

































































Year fixed effects  No No 
Observations  632 632 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.38 
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Table 8. Cash Holdings and Skilled Labor: Downward vs. Upward Adjustment Costs 
This table presents our findings on how the relation between a firm’s reliance on skilled labor and its cash 
holdings is affected by exogenous variations in downward versus upward adjustment costs. We examine how 
differences in the costs of firing or hiring across states affect the relation between LSI and cash holdings. Model 
1 investigates how differences in the costs of firing affect this relation. WDL measures the strength of Wrongful 
Discharge Laws (WDLs) in a state and is constructed by summing three distinct dummy variables for each of 
the three WDLs exceptions, where each dummy is set equal to one if the firm is in a state that has adopted the 
exception in question, and zero otherwise. Model 2 examines how differences in the costs of hiring across states 
affect the LSI and cash holdings relation. Hiring credits is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
quality rating of the job creation subsidies within the state in which the firm is headquartered is C- or above, and 
zero otherwise (Mattera et al. 2011). In Model 3, we examine how differences in firing and hiring costs affect 
the LSI and cash holdings relation concurrently. All variables, except the dummy variables listed above, are 
defined in Tables 1 and 2. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
industry level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 

























































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 50,861 50,833 50,833 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.30 0.31 
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Table 9. Cash Holdings and Skilled Labor: The Effect of Financial Constraints 
This table presents the impact of skilled labor on cash holdings for constrained (Const.) versus unconstrained 
(Unconst.) firms. We measure the degree of financial constraints using three different proxies: the Size and Age 
(SA) index (Hadlock and Pierce 2010), the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ) index, and the Whited and Wu 
(2006) (WW) index. The SA index is defined as −0.737 × Size + 0.043 × Size2 – 0.040 × Age. The KZ index is 
defined as −1.002 × Cash flow + 0.283 × Tobin’s q + 3.139 × Debt – 39.368 × Dividends – 1.315 × Cash 
holdings. The WW index is defined as −0.091 × Cash flow − 0.062 × Dividend dummy + 0.021 × Long-term 
debt − 0.044 × Size + 0.102 × Industry sales growth − 0.035 × Sales growth. Age is the number of years since 
the firm has been listed. Dividends is the ratio of common dividends (dvc) to total assets (at). Sales growth is 
measured as (sales in year t minus sales in year t1) / (sales in year t1). Industry Sales growth is the average 
sales growth of firms belonging to the same three-digit SIC-code industry. For each year, we define firms with 
above (below)-median scores on the SA, KZ, and WW indices as constrained (unconstrained). The last row 
reports the p-values of the F-test for differences between the coefficients on LSI for the two subsamples of 
constrained and unconstrained firms. All models include year dummies. All variables are defined in Tables 1 
and 2. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
































































































































































Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  18,345 18,352 34,025 34,032 27,668 27,672 
Adjusted R2  0.29 0.43 0.29 0.52 0.24 0.33 
p-value (F-test of 
equal coefficient 
estimates on LSI) 




Table 10. Cash Holdings and Skilled Labor: Labor Adjustment Costs or Intangible Capital? 
This table examines whether the relation between a firm’s reliance on skilled labor and its cash holdings is 
driven by labor adjustment costs or intangible capital. Models 13 report the results for the whole sample. In 
Models 46, we present the results for the high-skill firms (above-median LSI firms). Models 1 and 4 report the 
results for firms with no R&D spending. In Models 2 and 5, we include Intangible capital as an additional 
control. In Models 3 and 6, we examine the impact of LSI on cash holdings for firms with low intangible capital 
(bottom 30th percentile). We follow Peters and Taylor (2017) and define Intangible capital as the sum of 
internally created and externally purchased intangible capital. We measure the stock of internally created 
intangible capital as the sum of Knowledge capital, which we estimate by accumulating past R&D spending 
using the perpetual inventory method, and Organizational capital, which we estimate by accumulating a 
fraction (30%) of past selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses using the same method. Externally 
purchased intangible capital is the balance sheet item Intangible Assets (intan). We scale Intangible capital by 
the book value of total assets (at). All models include year dummies. All variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2 
of the paper. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  































































































































































Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  35,020 60,280 18,092 13,248 29,470 8,847 
Adjusted R2  0.15 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.23 0.26 
